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This game is rigged: The unequaL ProTecTion of our 
menTaLLy-iLL incarceraTed women
By 
Joanna E. Saul*
inTroducTion
More mentally-ill women fill our jails and prisons every 
day.1 Within the past few years, the number of women entering 
our state prisons has increased at almost twice the rate of men.2 
Even more astonishing is that 73% of these women in state pris-
ons have a mental health problem, in striking contrast to only 
55% of male state inmates.3 Both male and female inmates are 
equally dependent on the state to provide mental health treatment 
and both have an equal right to care under the 
Constitution.4 However, women often receive 
mental health services inferior in quality and 
quantity to those received by men. 
If denied treatment, female inmates 
may have to resort to the courts. In 2005, sev-
eral female inmates at the Taycheedah Cor-
rectional Institution in Wisconsin filed Flynn 
v. Doyle5 with the assistance of the Wisconsin 
ACLU on behalf of all women incarcerated in 
Taycheedah. The lead plaintiff, Kristine Flynn, is a 48 year old 
woman who suffers from bipolar mood disorder and social anxi-
ety syndrome.6 She is considered seriously mentally-ill by the 
Wisconsin Department of Corrections.7 According to the com-
plaint, Flynn was prescribed eight different psychotropic medi-
cations within one year, taking some of them simultaneously.8 
Yet she only had her blood drawn once to test her liver function 
during that year.9 In 2002, prison staff ordered her to be immedi-
ately taken off of all medications.10 Flynn attempted suicide six 
days later.11 After being taken to the hospital, she took one person 
hostage and assaulted a security guard.12 The court-appointed 
psychiatrist testified that her behavior was due to the interruption 
in her medication, yet an entire month passed after the assault 
before she was remedicated.13 Four years were added to her sen-
tence, she was housed in segregation, and she still did not receive 
her medication.14 Flynn was unable to eat, sleep, or take care 
of her basic needs during this period15 and she attempted sui-
cide again.16 She did not receive any group or individual therapy, 
despite having requested counseling several times.17 This case is 
still pending in the Eastern District Court of Wisconsin.
Flynn is representative not only of women in the Wis-
consin correctional system, but of mentally-ill women in cor-
rectional institutions across the nation who receive inadequate 
and ultimately harmful treatment. Imprisoned litigants, such as 
Flynn, will have to battle separately in each state for their mental 
health needs. And indeed, if the prison system ignores their needs, 
courts may be the best recourse. According to the Supreme Court, 
“[w]hen a prison regulation or practice offends a fundamental 
constitutional guarantee, federal courts will discharge their duty 
to protect constitutional rights.”18 Yet this promise may be mere 
talk: in reality, the courts have granted “substantial deference” to 
prison authorities19 and have perpetuated gender discrimination.
This paper will examine recent inmate equal protection 
cases and will argue that Flynn and similar plaintiffs nationwide 
stand little chance of success, given the impossible standard 
established by the federal appellate courts that defeats any equal 
protection claim brought by female inmates. Part I will introduce 
the problem of inadequate mental health treatment for female 
inmates, including the current level of illness in the female popu-
lation entering prison, and the gender-based differences in care 
that the women receive. Part II will examine the Equal Protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
in relation to the American correctional 
system. It will compare the most recent 
Equal Protection cases brought by prison 
inmates to the seminal case of United 
States v. Virginia, involving female col-
lege students. This section will also advo-
cate for a similar application of the law 
to the claims of female inmates. Part III 
will conclude that courts need to create 
a workable standard that ensures the constitutional equal protec-
tion rights of female inmates. 
i. The inadequaTe TreaTmenT of menTaLLy-iLL 
women Prisoners
Mental illness is a serious problem for the majority of 
America’s female inmate population. Inadequate mental health 
resources for female inmates affect more than just the residents 
within the prison walls: most inmates eventually leave the prison 
and return to the community from which they came.20 The fol-
lowing sections examine first the prevalence of mental health ill-
nesses among female inmates; second, gender-based differences 
in mental health treatment in prisons; and third, the constitutional 
right of inmates to adequate mental health treatment.
a. tHe mental illneSS oF ameriCa’S priSon 
population 
The mental health of America’s inmates is in a crisis: 
73% of women in state prisons have a mental health problem.21 
The cause of this crisis is clear: as public mental hospitals have 
emptied due to cost and other pressures, the mentally-ill, who 
rightfully should be treated in a hospital setting, have entered 
our prison systems.22 From 1955 to 2000, the number of patients 
housed in state mental hospitals dropped from almost 560,000 
to about 56,000.23 Between 2000 and 2003, the average number 
of residents in state- and county-run mental hospitals was less 
than 50,000.24 Similarly, the lengths of stays in private psychiat-
ric hospitals dropped from twenty-one days per episode in 1980 
to five or six days in 2004.25 Conversely, the adult population in 
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under correctional supervision grew from 1,842,100 in 1980 to 
7,211,400 in 2006.26 According to a recent Bureau of Justice Sta-
tistics’ estimation, 705,600 inmates in state prisons had a mental 
health problem at midyear 2005.27 Assuming these numbers are 
correct, there are currently fourteen times as many mentally-ill 
persons housed in our correctional facilities 
as in our state mental hospitals. Women in 
particular are afflicted, as a greater percent-
age of female inmates are reported to have 
a mental health problem,28 while there is 
lesser availability of treatment.
In addition to their basic mental 
health needs, inmates with mental health 
problems also have a higher probability of 
substance abuse29 and self-harm, includ-
ing suicide.30 Drug abuse has serious public health implications, 
including the increased risk of disease transmission, such as HIV/
AIDS, as well as the risk of injury to any children the women 
may be carrying. A strong correlation exists between severe men-
tal disorders and suicidal inclinations31—suicide is therefore a 
substantial concern with any mentally-ill incarcerated popula-
tion and particularly with female inmates.32 Common methods 
of suicide attempts by inmates include hanging, overdose, lac-
eration, asphyxiation, and ingestion of toxic substances such as 
shampoo.33 
Female inmates across America are afflicted with men-
tal health problems that require attention. Without effective 
treatment, these women return to the community with the same 
illnesses, if not made worse due to the length of time without 
treatment.
b. genDer biaS in tHe proviSion oF mental HealtH 
ServiCeS in priSon 
Gender bias in prison has resulted in both over- diagnosis 
and under-diagnosis of mental illness. Historically, prison staff 
have used medication to sedate inmates and control disruptive 
behavior.34 Criminal women in particular have been “treated” 
because they exhibited “male” characteristics such as anger or 
aggression that did not fit the societal mold of the docile home-
maker.35 Conversely, female mentally-ill inmates often suffer 
from inadequate treatment because they are not correctly iden-
tified as mentally-ill or because the prison does not have the 
resources to treat them.36 Prisons that do not have the necessary 
resources frequently house the mentally-ill in disciplinary seg-
regation, limiting the inmates’ access to programming or social 
interaction.37 
A primary obstacle to the adequate treatment of men-
tally-ill female inmates is the lack of a national validated instru-
ment for mental health screening for adult prison.38 Each state 
has come up with its own system, with varying success. In gen-
eral, prisons’ tools for screening inmates with mental illnesses are 
faulty.39 Without a standardized, reliable system, prison staff are 
subject to the gender stereotypes that have been shown to affect 
treatment choices and they are more likely to overlook inmates 
who do need treatment. The inmates themselves may not know 
that they have a problem and therefore may not bring themselves 
to the attention of a mental health professional. For example, in 
a Bureau of Justice Statistics’ study in 1999, only 24% of women 
in state prison and local jails evaluated themselves as being 
mentally-ill.40 In comparison, in a 2006 study, when others within 
the prison were surveyed regarding symptoms demonstrated by 
the inmate population, 73% of the female state inmate population 
were identified as mentally-ill.41 Clearly, better screening tools 
need to be developed and used. 
Even when women are success-
fully identified by a screening instrument, 
men have better access to medical ser-
vices42 by virtue of their larger popula-
tion. Many treatment programs have been 
designed with men in mind43 and have not 
taken into account the unique needs of the 
female population.44 In addition, several 
state prison systems have facilities desig-
nated solely for use as a psychiatric hospital 
for men, but have no corresponding facilities for women.45 This 
is a primary basis for complaint in Flynn v. Doyle: in Wisconsin, 
only men have access to a facility providing round-the-clock care 
and individualized treatment.46 The prisons justify gender sepa-
rations in prison based on security reasons and limited finances. 
However, under the Equal Protection Clause, women should not 
be denied the same level of care available to men simply based 
on their gender.
C. tHe ConStitutional requirement For mental 
HealtH treatment in priSon
Under the Eighth Amendment, prisons are constitution-
ally required to provide medical health care for inmates.47 The 
Fourth and Fifth Circuits have interpreted this obligation as inclu-
sive of mental health care.48 According to the Fourth Circuit,
[an inmate] is entitled to psychological or psy-
chiatric treatment if a physician or other health 
care provider, exercising ordinary skill and 
care at the time of observation, concludes with 
reasonable medical certainty (1) that the pris-
oner’s symptoms evidence a serious disease or 
injury; (2) that such disease or injury is cur-
able or may be substantially alleviated; and (3) 
that the potential for harm to the prisoner by 
reason of delay or the denial of care would be 
substantial.49 
The numerous phrases open to interpretation in the above stan-
dard render it useless for practical guidance to prison officials.50 
Thus, several district courts have provided more definite guide-
posts by which to judge a prison health care system:
The six components are: (1) a systematic pro-
gram for screening and evaluating inmates to 
identify those in need of mental health care; (2) 
a treatment program that involves more than 
segregation and close supervision of mentally 
ill inmates; (3) employment of a sufficient 
number of trained mental health profession-
als; (4) maintenance of accurate, complete, and 
confidential mental health treatment records; 
(5) administration of psychotropic medication 
only with appropriate supervision and peri-
odic evaluation; and (6) a basic program to 
Under the Eighth  
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identify, treat, and supervise inmates at risk for 
suicide.51 
While this standard provides more definite boundaries for a 
prison healthcare program, it has not been affirmed by a higher 
court.52 Ultimately, female inmates’ constitutional right to and 
need for adequate mental health care is not being met.
ii. The unequaL ProTecTion of  
femaLe inmaTes 
Female inmates wishing to sue prisons based on their 
inadequate treatment will find that the federal courts have nar-
rowed prison-based equal protection law such that it is nearly 
impossible for female inmates to succeed. The courts have estab-
lished two barriers to a successful action: (1) splitting hairs over 
what constitutes “similarly situated” inmate groups and (2) def-
erence to prison finances. 
a. tHe CourtS’ DiSCriminatory appliCation oF  
equal proteCtion law 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires the government to treat similarly situated people 
alike.53 It prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of 
gender by state actors.54 Under this standard, discriminatory 
classification or treatment between men and women is subject to 
heightened scrutiny.55 For a gender-based classification to with-
stand the heightened standard of scrutiny, it must “serve impor-
tant governmental objectives,” and “the discriminatory means 
employed [must be] substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives.” 56 To succeed on an equal protection claim, a 
plaintiff must pass a threshold showing that she is similarly situ-
ated to others who received more favorable treatment.57 The next 
sections will examine the recent history of equal protection juris-
prudence, providing an in-depth look at the courts’ reasoning. 
1. equal pRotection of female inmates
 Flynn’s biggest challenge in the Equal Protection arena 
is finding a “similarly situated” group to satisfy the courts. “Sim-
ilarly situated” has been broadly defined by the Supreme Court: 
the two groups do not have to be alike in every aspect.58 In fact, 
in City of Clebourne v. Clebourne Living Center, the Supreme 
Court said that even though the group home for the mentally dis-
abled, which was denied a permit by the city, was different from 
other facilities that were permitted permits, the main question 
was whether the proposed group home would affect the legiti-
mate governmental interests in a way that the permitted uses did 
not.59 In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
District No. 1,60 a case involving students of different ages and 
races, and schools of different sizes, the question of whether the 
students were similarly situated did not even arise.
Female inmates, however, have received far different 
treatment in the lower courts. For example, in Klinger v. Dep’t of 
Corrections, the plaintiffs housed at Nebraska’s female institu-
tion stated for the purposes of litigation that they were similarly 
situated to a male facility.61 The trial court agreed that the two 
groups were similarly situated because they were both housed in 
Nebraska correctional institutions, the institutions had a similar 
range of custodial levels, and the purposes of incarceration were 
the same for both groups.62 The Eighth Circuit, however, reversed 
the lower court’s decision by highlighting the differences between 
the two institutions: the male facility housed six times as many 
inmates as the women’s; the average stay at the men’s facility was 
two to three times as long as at the women’s; the men’s facility 
was two security grades higher than the women’s; and the women 
had different characteristics from the men due to their paren-
tal status and likelihood of past abuse.63 Further, the appellate 
court highlighted economic limitations: “[W]hen determining 
programming at an individual prison under the restrictions of a 
limited budget, prison officials must make hard choices.” 64 Thus, 
the court was willing to allow inferior programming for women 
based on “limited resources.” 65 The court seemed to conclude 
that comparing male and female institutions is not just compar-
ing apples and oranges, but comparing apples and Volkswagens.
The Eighth Circuit also granted substantial deference 
to the prisons.66 The court concluded that doing any prison-to-
prison program comparison was “futile” and that doing such 
a comparison “places the burden on prison officials to explain 
decisions that resulted from the complicated interplay of many 
variables.” 67 The court stated that any such asking of explana-
tion would result in “micro-management” and worried that the 
facilities would end up providing only the “bare constitutional 
minimum of programs and services to avoid the threat of equal 
protection liability.” 68 The aim of the litigation was to show that 
the prison already was failing to provide the “bare constitutional 
minimum.” Thus, in providing its worst-case scenario of the 
prison sticking to the bare minimum, the court avoids forcing the 
prisons to abide by the Constitution so as to avoid litigation.
In the murkiness of prison-based equal protection litiga-
tion, at least one court has made clear what “similarly situated” 
does not mean: in Women Prisoners of the D.C. Dep’t of Correc-
tions v. D.C., the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
rejected a three-factor test that included similar custody levels, 
sentence structures, and purposes of incarceration.69 Instead, the 
court emphasized that there are “many considerations” and “innu-
merable variables,” including the characteristics of the inmates and 
the size of the institution.70 This standard is extremely vague and 
presents difficulties to future female prisoner litigants in choos-
ing a similarly situated group to which to compare themselves. 
Yet even after this rhetoric of innumerable variables, the court 
focused on but one: the fact that the men’s prison had 936 inmates 
and the women’s prison had only 167.71 The court concluded that 
“it is hardly surprising, let alone evidence of discrimination” that 
the smaller facility had fewer programs.72 This holding is disturb-
ing because it in effect denies to women inmates any potential 
success on equal protection grounds. Women compose a much 
smaller percentage of the total inmate population.73 The smaller 
number of female inmates allows most states to house all women 
in the same, multi-classification prison, while men by virtue of 
their greater population size can be broken into institutions by 
individual classifications.74 Under the court’s holding, even if 
the women were housed in separate institutions by classification, 
they would not be similarly situated to the men due to population; 
and if the women were housed together, they would not be simi-
larly situated due to classification. The court fails to acknowledge 
this reality.
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Other courts have also adhered to this belief that differ-
ing sizes in population necessitates differing number and qual-
ity of programs. In Keenan v. Smith, in which female inmates 
brought an equal protection action based on denial of post-
 secondary education programs and prison industry employment, 
the Eighth Circuit stated that “because 
women account for such a small proportion 
of the total prison population, their facilities 
are necessarily smaller in size than any of 
the male-only prisons.” 75 It further admitted 
that due to the small size of the institution, 
the most comparable in size of the male 
institutions is an institution of the highest 
security classification.76 The Keenan court 
concluded that two sets of dissimilarly situ-
ated inmates cannot be meaningfully com-
pared.77 At least in this case, Judge Heaney 
acknowledged the reality that under these 
standards, no group of female inmates could ever have standing 
for an equal protection claim.78 His is a lone voice. The logical 
extension of the court’s opinions is that women must wait until 
an equal number of women and men are incarcerated before they 
can ask for equal services and programs.
As a thought experiment, let us follow the courts’ logic 
to its conclusion. For women to establish themselves as similarly 
situated to men, they must compare themselves by either (1) secu-
rity classification or (2) population. Female inmates have a low 
chance of successful comparison under the first prong because 
while most of female prisons include prisoners of all classifica-
tions, the men’s prisons are often broken up into individual clas-
sifications due to the number of inmates at each classification 
level.79 Thus, no such similarly situated group exists. Under the 
second prong, if women were to use population size to establish 
a similarly situated group, they would be limited to the highest 
security men’s prisons. The highest security men’s prisons often 
house their inmates in solitary confinement for twenty-three 
hours a day and therefore offer few, if any, programs.80 Fight-
ing for these programs would not win the female inmates more 
programming than they already have. For the female inmates, it 
is a losing game.
In shocking contrast, when men raise the equal protec-
tion issue, the courts take an entirely different view. Only a year 
before Keenan, a male inmate brought an equal protection claim 
before the Eighth Circuit in Bills v. Dahm81 and received sig-
nificantly different treatment. In Bills, the male inmate alleged 
that he was denied overnight visitation from his infant son while 
female inmates were allowed such visitation.82 Instead of review-
ing its laundry list of differences between a male Level 2 facil-
ity and a female Level 4 facility—the same levels of facilities 
contemplated in Klinger 83—the court stated that “[b]oth prisons 
hold a significant number of maximum security offenders.” 84 Pre-
sumably, no drastic changes had occurred in the Nebraska cor-
rectional system, yet the court offered no analysis of the differing 
population sizes. Instead, the court concluded that “the make-up 
of the inmate population at each of the prisons are not markedly 
dissimilar,” yet allows, grudgingly, that it is “objectively reason-
able” for a prison official to have believed that the two groups 
of inmates were not similarly situated.85 This is a quite a change 
from the previous opinions that found an insurmountable differ-
ence between male and female prisons.
The court finishes with a parting lecture to the correc-
tional authorities on the constitutional rights of inmates—a lec-
ture notably absent from the cases involving female inmates. The 
court begins with the lofty statement that “[t]he great object of 
our Constitution is to preserve individual rights” and that “prison 
inmates are not completely stripped of 
these rights as they step through the 
prison gates.” 86 Further, the court chides 
that a “prisoner may not be denied equal 
treatment afforded those who share his 
relevant characteristics, simply because 
statistics show that he belongs to a group 
that typically does not bear those relevant 
characteristics.” 87 This is remarkable: in 
other words, a prisoner cannot be denied 
equal treatment afforded to others, “sim-
ply” because statistics and data demon-
strate that he is not actually equal to the 
others. No such allowance for numerical discrepancies was evi-
dent in the women’s cases. The gender discrimination evident in 
the courts’ opinions mars any chance that female inmates might 
have to bring a successful equal protection suit.
Even if the inmates could prove that they were similarly 
situated, they would still have to show that the statute or regu-
lation intentionally discriminated against them. In Canterino v. 
Wilson, the Sixth Circuit found that the female inmates “failed 
to prove that the denial of study and work release to members 
of their class is gender-based discrimination on its face, because 
both men and women are included in the class of people who 
may be denied study and work release.” 88 Under this standard, 
a claim based on the denial of programs could potentially fail 
simply because not all male inmates received care. 
In some cases, gender segregation in prison may provide 
sufficient evidence of gender discrimination so that discrimina-
tory intent need not be established. A Fourth Circuit opinion 
found that “discriminatory intent need not be established inde-
pendently when the classification is explicit.” 89 Prisons across 
the nation are segregated by gender and, although such segrega-
tion has been found to be constitutional,90 the practice of sending 
women to one prison and men to another facially classifies on the 
basis of gender.91 If the court finds that the resulting difference 
in access to services imposes a burden on the female inmates, 
discriminatory intent may not need to be established. 
Overall, the courts have created an unworkable stan-
dard, yet refuse to acknowledge that it effectively bars incarcer-
ated female litigants from recovery. Courts should not dismiss 
an Equal Protection case based on population differences, but 
should start from the premise that male and female inmates are 
similarly situated due to the equal dependence on the state to pro-
vide mental health services and both have an equal right to care 
under the Constitution. 
2. united states v. virginia: sepaRate  
But not equal
In United States v. Virginia, decided shortly after the 
above cases, the Supreme Court contemplated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause in regard to gender segregated institutions of higher 
education, coming to a very different result. The Virginia Mil-
itary Institute (“VMI”) historically accepted only men into its 
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academy.92 VMI enrolled about 1,300 male cadets each year.93 
In response to litigation contesting its refusal of female candi-
dates, VMI proposed a separate, parallel program for women: 
Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership (“VMIL”), which had 
an expected first-year class of twenty-five women.94 While the 
institutions would share the same mission, “the VWIL program 
would differ from VMI in academic offerings, methods of educa-
tion, and financial resources,” 95 largely based on the perceived 
differences and needs of a female population.96 The different 
population sizes and program options are analogous to those in 
male and female prisons, yet here the Court ruled in favor of 
the female plaintiffs, finding that VWIL was not an appropriately 
parallel program and that VMI must admit female cadets. A court 
has even more reason to make a similar ruling in favor of female 
inmates; students have the option of choosing whether to attend 
an inferior school whereas female inmates have no choice.
Justice Ginsburg began her opinion in Virginia with the 
core instruction of equal protection analysis: “Parties who seek 
to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an 
exceedingly persuasive justification for that action.” 97 The court 
“has repeatedly recognized that neither federal nor state govern-
ment acts compatibly with the equal protection principle when 
a law or official policy denies to women, simply because they 
are women, full citizenship stature—equal opportunity to aspire, 
achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their 
individual talents and capacities.” 98 Any justification of such a 
policy must demonstrate “important governmental objectives and 
that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related 
to the achievement of those objectives.” 99 Sex-based classifica-
tions may not be used “to create or perpetuate the legal, social, 
and economic inferiority of women.”100 In Flynn’s case, the gen-
der differences in availability of treatment result in distinct dis-
advantages to female inmates: they receive inferior mental health 
services, which will affect their ability to participate in voca-
tional training and other programming integral to post-release 
success. When the prison denies them equal services, they are 
maintained in an inferior position relative to the men who receive 
the services, a disadvantage that affects the women even post-
incarceration.
In examining VMI’s justification for the male-only clas-
sification, the court stated that a justification “must describe 
actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact 
differently grounded.”101 The court rejected Virginia’s claim 
that VMI furthered diversity in educational institution choices; 
although single-sex institutions may in fact promote diversity, 
Virginia’s public institution history provided no evidence that 
VMI’s single-sex admission policy was intended to further this 
purpose.102 Applying this analysis to Flynn’s case, the primary 
reason for gender-segregation in prison appears to be popula-
tion management or security. Neither reason, however, bears any 
rational relation to the differing quality of mental health treat-
ment between the male and female institutions. 
Differences in institutional populations did not keep the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia from finding similarly 
situated groups. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
justified its holding denying programs to the smaller female cor-
rectional institutions by stating that parents of students at Smith 
College, an all-female institution, would not raise an eyebrow to 
discover that Harvard University, many times Smith’s size, offers 
considerably more classes.103 In contrast, the Supreme Court did 
not even discuss in Virginia the 1,300 student enrollment of VMI 
in comparison with the twenty-five student enrollment of VWIL. 
In addition, inmates have an even stronger claim for 
medical and mental health services than for educational pro-
gramming.104 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
stated that “an inmate has no constitutional right to work and 
educational opportunities.”105 Yet under an Eighth Amendment 
analysis in Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court declared that 
the government has an obligation to provide medical care for 
those whom it is punishing by incarceration.106 If the Supreme 
Court was dissatisfied with a facility that planned to enroll a mere 
twenty-five female students a year, surely the federal courts can 
do better for the 112,498 women in prison who are denied not 
just educational opportunities, but health care to which they have 
a constitutional right.
The second prong of the Virginia analysis focused on 
the proposed remedial measures to be taken by Virginia to rem-
edy the equal protection violation. Any remedy must “closely 
fit the constitutional violation [and] must be shaped to place 
persons unconstitutionally denied an opportunity or advan-
tage in the position they would have occupied in the absence of 
discrimination.”107 In the context of prisons, the mental health 
resources currently available to men—such as separate facilities 
solely for the treatment of mentally-ill inmates and additional 
health staff and programs—must be made equally available to 
female inmates.
Overall, the federal circuit courts have largely dismissed 
female inmates’ suits based on a flawed notion of what consti-
tutes a “similarly situated” party. In contrast, the Supreme Court 
has always treated the similarly situated analysis as inclusive of 
groups with some differences and has applied it to higher educa-
tion institutions much more leniently than the appellate courts 
have to the female inmate litigants. 
b. tHe ‘important governmental obJeCtive’  
oF parSimony
The primary justification for a prison’s discriminatory 
policies often comes down to economics. If gender discrimina-
tion is established, it may still survive heightened scrutiny if the 
correctional authorities can establish important governmental 
objectives that are accomplished through this discrimination.108 
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has already 
declared that, even allowing that a burden has been imposed on 
female inmates due to gender discrimination, limited financial 
resources are enough reason to justify the prison’s discrimina-
tion.109 The Eighth Circuit has also found that any analysis of 
gender discrimination in female inmates’ programming must 
make allowances for the prison’s limited resources and economic 
constraints.110 Even in Bowring v. Godwin, a case that extended 
an inmate’s constitutional right to medical care to also include 
mental health care,111 the Fourth Circuit stated:
The right to treatment is, of course, limited to 
that which may be provided upon a reasonable 
cost and time basis and the essential test is one 
of medical necessity and not simply that which 
may be considered merely desirable.112 
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State University. Thanks to Erica Weisgerber for her superior assistance.
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